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ABSTRACT: The heart of Dewey’s call to humanize techno-
industrial civilization was to conceive science and 
technology in the service of aesthetic consummations. 
Hence his philosophy suggests a way to reclaim and 
affirm technology on behalf of living more fulfilling lives. 
He remains a powerful ally today in the fight against 
deadening efficiency, narrow means-end calculation, 
“frantic exploitation,” and the industrialization of 
everything. Nonetheless, it is common to depict him as a 
philosopher we should think around rather than with. 
The first section of this essay explores his philosophy of 
technology and environment in light of Bacon, 
Heidegger, and Borgmann. Most of the techno-industrial 
and vocational activities which we pretend are 
“instrumental,” Dewey argued, actually reduce “to a very 
minimum the esthetic aspect of experiences had in the 
course of the daily occupation.” It is argued that, insofar 
as cooperative intelligence can guide the direction of 
technological development, it does not honor 
contemplative life if we abdicate or downgrade that 
responsibility. The second section of this essay explores 
Dewey’s instrumentalism as a critique of vicious 
intellectualism. It is argued that, for Dewey, genuine 
progress serves the aesthetic dimension of experience. 
This assertion contrasts with the most common 
interpretive error among both critics and admirers of 
Dewey, namely that he is mostly a champion of science. 
Moreover, critics of Dewey’s instrumentalist theory of 
inquiry often mistake it as (a) an attack on any 
conception of intrinsic value, or (b) an attempt to 
collapse the value of means into the value of ends. In 
Dewey’s view, we habitually look for progress in the 
wrong place because we carry around with us some big 
idea of a final and ultimate good for measuring it. In his 
view, the ameliorative expansion of significance that 
emerges from our dealings with perplexing situations is 
the only place progress can really be found. 
 
 
In his 1919 lectures at Tokyo University, published in 
1920 as Reconstruction in Philosophy, John Dewey 
suggested that the foremost global philosophical 
challenge is to reconcile East Asian contemplative–
aesthetic attitudes with Euro-American scientific–
experimental attitudes. During two and a half years in 
East Asia and in subsequent work, Dewey made early 
steps in the direction of a global philosophical outlook by 
promoting a fusion of aesthetic refinements with 
experimentalism.  
Dewey’s aim, as he made explicit in Japan, was to set 
forth the possibility and method by which techno-
industrial civilization might be humanized. Without the 
methods of science, he argued, we drift at the mercy of 
natural forces. But without lives rich in aesthetic 
consummations, he portended in Reconstruction in 
Philosophy, we “might become a race of economic 
monsters, restlessly driving hard bargains with nature 
and with one another, bored with leisure or capable of 
putting it to use only in ostentatious display and 
extravagant dissipation” (MW 12:152).
1
 
 
Dewey’s Philosophy of Technology and Environment: 
Beyond Bacon, Beyond Heidegger 
 
“The solution to any problem from technology isn’t less 
technology but more technology,” said a cofounder of 
Wired magazine.
2
 Dewey’s likely response to this bold 
assertion depends on the meaning of technology. Under 
the economic and cultural conditions in which industrial 
technology currently operates, this blanket endorsement 
is sadly misguided. Dewey remains a powerful ally today 
in the fight against deadening efficiency, narrow means-
end calculation, “frantic exploitation” (LW 5:268), and 
the industrialization of everything. He was a scathing 
critic of blind and ill-considered “technology as it 
operates under existing political-economic-cultural 
conditions” (LW 15:190), as he wrote in The Humanist in 
1945.
3
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Citations of John Dewey’s works are for the critical 
edition published by Southern Illinois University Press 
under the editorship of Jo Ann Boydston. Citations give 
series abbreviation followed by volume number and 
page number. For example: (LW 10:12) is page 12 of Art 
as Experience, which is published as volume 10 of The 
Later Works. Series abbreviations for The Collected 
Works of John Dewey: EW The Early Works (1882–1898), 
MW The Middle Works (1899–1924), LW The Later 
Works (1925–1953). 
2
 Kevin Kelly in “Marketplace,” National Public Radio, 
October 19, 2010. 
http://www.marketplace.org/shows/marketplace/marke
tplace-october-19-2010 ; accessed May 17, 2016. 
3
 Cf. Dewey, Unmodern Philosophy and Modern 
Philosophy, ed. Phillip Deen (Carbondale, IL: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 2012), 344. 
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Despite current narrow usage, all tool- or knowledge-
based mediation of our environments is in a broad sense 
technological, if the term is approached along ancient 
Greek lines as processes that take place by means of 
human invention.
4
 Technology in this inclusive sense, 
Dewey observed in “What I Believe,” “signifies all the 
intelligent techniques by which the energies of nature 
and man are directed … ; it cannot be limited to a few 
outer and comparatively mechanical forms” (LW 5:270). 
This broad sense suggests a way to reclaim and affirm 
technology on behalf of living more fulfilling lives. 
In his 1969 book Agrarianism in American Literature, 
Thomas Inge expressed a widely held view: technology 
corrupts while nature redeems.
5
 This notion dualistically 
sets technology in opposition to nature. A Dewey-
inspired pragmatic approach rejects this persistent 
tendency to pit human intelligence in an antagonistic 
relation to nature, asks us to get clearer about our ends 
and values, and reflects on which technological 
innovations are functional or dysfunctional means to our 
most valuable ends. 
We are always entangled in the hazy assumptions of 
our own day and the uninspected doctrines of bygone 
days. Economist Paul Krugman has lately called such 
bygone doctrines “zombie ideas,” creeds of the living 
dead.
6
 The habit of conceiving technology in an 
antagonistic way, or as an alien visitation, is among the 
most disturbingly consequential of our outdated zombie 
ideas.  
                                                 
4
 Larry Hickman emphasizes technological management, 
not control, and he argues that for Dewey technology 
was a way of engaging the world through the tools of 
inquiry. See, for example, Hickman’s “Nature as Culture: 
John Dewey’s Pragmatic Naturalism,” in Environmental 
Pragmatism, ed. Andrew Light and Eric Katz (London: 
Routledge, 1996). 
5
 M. Thomas lnge, Agrarianism in American Literature 
(New York: Odysseus Press, 1969). In Paul Thompson, 
The Agrarian Vision (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2012), 7. 
6
 Paul Krugman, “Rubio and the Zombies,” The New York 
Times, February 14, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/15/opinion/krugman-
rubio-andthe-zombies.html?_r=0; accessed May 17, 2016. 
If any outdated dualism foreshortens much of the 
history of American environmental thought, it is the 
sharp separation of human actors from pristine nature. 
For example, until relatively recently the prevailing 
tendency among wilderness advocates in the United 
States was to speak and write as though human 
inventiveness and technology are alien Euro-American 
intruders upon the natural scene. Nature, it was long 
held, is exemplified in wilderness, sharply set over and 
against things urbane, domestic, and agricultural.  
This dualistic notion was intelligible in its original 
context. The classic idea of harmonious nature, married 
to the persistent (anti-Darwinian) Aristotelian doctrine 
that nature does nothing in vain, fed a nineteenth-
century romantic backlash against the modern Cartesian 
schism of values from nature. In the United States, 
romantic tendencies toward the revalorization of nature 
shone through the transcendentalists Emerson and 
Thoreau and found an environmental champion in John 
Muir’s influential view of nature as a sympathetic home 
that ultimately requires little adaptation or 
transformation.  
On Muir’s romantic “preservationist” view—in 
contrast with the narrowly utilitarian “conservationist” 
view advanced by Gifford Pinchot, founder of the United 
States Forest Service in 1905—things in nature are 
ultimately what they ought to be. This is a pleasant 
thought, until we remember with Dewey that we have 
intellectually fashioned, reified, and idolized a 
harmonious and complete Nature in the image of our 
own greatly magnified human ideals. It is easier to serve 
and accommodate, without reshaping, a natural world 
that we believe has a final interconnected order, a single 
ultimate purpose, and an infinite stock of goodness. Our 
world, however, is dynamic and still emerging, not 
perfected. 
We did not begin “playing God” with the advent of 
nuclear technology or genetic modification. If playing 
God means elevating humans above nature, then 
Western tradition has cast human minds and human 
knowledge in this worrisome transcendental role all 
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along. Since the seventeenth century, philosophers have 
increasingly downplayed or dismissed the old 
supernaturalism while retaining the damaging sense of 
separateness from nature. They have thereby increased 
the antagonism that pits us against nature. These 
intellectual habits have outlived whatever usefulness 
they once had. Dewey’s alternative approach was to 
reclaim technology as part of our cultural inhabitation of 
nature. He suggested a way to extol science and its 
technological applications, at least in the abstract, as 
essential to actualizing our most humane ideals. For in 
Dewey’s view, the defensible aim of science and 
technology is to help make our lives together more 
significant and resilient. 
By the 1940s Dewey even favored the word 
technology—if taken in his very broad sense—over 
instrumentalism to convey his operational view of 
scientific knowledge (LW 15:89). So taken, instead of 
calling a referendum on technology, we should strive to 
alter the current conditions in family, education, 
government, and industry in which our technologies are 
currently developed and deployed. 
It is common to cherry-pick statements that depict 
Dewey as an excessive technocrat, a philosopher we 
should think around rather than with. Dewey’s circa 
1920s confidence in the humanizing arts of technological 
control at times strains our twenty-first-century eyes 
fatigued by resource depletion, oil wars, climate change, 
and American swagger. In his historical overview of the 
modern mechanical worldview in Reconstruction in 
Philosophy—which along with The Quest for Certainty 
contains his best technocratic cherries to pick—Dewey 
celebrated technologies implicated in some of our most 
serious contemporary environmental problems. For 
example, he wrote approvingly: “When chemical 
fertilizers can be used in place of animal manures, when 
improved grain and cattle can be purposefully bred from 
inferior animals and grasses, when mechanical energy 
can be converted into heat and electricity into 
mechanical energy, man gains power to manipulate 
nature” (MW 12:120).  
A twenty-first-century nose catches occasional whiffs 
of Francis Bacon’s “empire over nature” whenever 
Dewey overindulges in admiration for the industrial 
revolution and its progressive actualization of Bacon’s 
watchword: “knowledge is power.” Bertrand Russell 
even presented Dewey as a “power” philosopher 
promoting a socialized and technologically enhanced 
version of Nietzsche’s will-to-power.
7
 Russell’s 
pronouncements, though they remain very influential, 
never reflected any serious attempt to understand 
Dewey’s positions.  
Through the work of philosophical reconstruction, 
Dewey sought to “permit the Baconian aspirations to 
come to a free and unhindered expression” (MW 
12:108). Bacon’s active and operative inductive method 
of the 1620s of course heralded the empiricism of the 
eighteenth century and, eventually, the experimental 
methods that gradually took hold in the nineteenth 
century. It was not a mistake, Dewey wrote in 
Reconstruction in Philosophy, to banish Aristotelian final 
causes from nature and to shift discussion about 
purposes to “factors in human minds capable of 
reshaping existence” (MW 12:120). Dewey baldly stated 
that “A natural world that does not subsist for the sake 
of realizing a fixed set of ends is relatively malleable and 
plastic; it may be used for this end or that” (MW 12:120).  
So, Dewey shared Bacon’s commitment to advancing 
human welfare through scientific knowledge. But he 
thoroughly rejected Baconian philosophy as entangled in 
a tragically flawed view of human intelligence as “an 
exaggeratedly self-sufficient Ego” (MW 12:108). Bacon 
conceived human experience as dualistically set over and 
against nature, which must be subjugated. Hence Bacon 
valued and obeyed nature only inasmuch as this was 
necessary to extract secrets for humane ends. In 
Dewey’s opposing view, as expressed in arguably his 
most Baconian book, experimental intelligence can 
                                                 
7
 Russell suggests that this is related to Dewey’s Hegelian 
roots. On this controversy, see Tom Burke, Dewey’s New 
Logic: A Reply to Russell (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1998), 21ff. 
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indeed transform the world and reshape “those phases 
of nature and life that obstruct social well-being” (MW 
12:108). But we thwart our own best aims when we fail 
to understand that human initiative, inventiveness, and 
labor are themselves natural events for which we are 
responsible. Technology and intelligent innovation does 
not descend from the heavens or from a psychical inner 
realm separated from our bodies and cultures. Sidney 
Hook summed up this humane, naturalistic spirit of 
Dewey’s philosophy: “He has shown with patient detail 
that intelligence is at home in the natural world and not 
a mysterious intruder bringing its own standards from a 
realm beyond the skies.”
8
 
Dewey’s existential attitude of “natural piety” in A 
Common Faith (1934) was an attempt to reconcile what 
is best in Euro-American romanticism with our scientific 
outlooks toward nature. Any appraisal of the 
shortcomings of Dewey’s own natural piety, such as his 
systematic failure to appreciate the extent to which parts 
of nonhuman nature are looking back at us with 
awareness, should also recall the deep imprint of 
Emerson upon his thinking (e.g., MW 3:184-192). 
Dewey’s pragmatism was an outgrowth of the American 
philosophical tradition, a fact that happily complicates 
any caricature of him as blithely celebrating what 
American environmental historian Donald Worster has 
helpfully called a “Linnaean” model of the exploitation of 
nature.
9
  
Heidegger, whose philosophy of technology is often 
cited in opposition to Dewey, contended that means–
end reasoning inevitably overreaches because it puts us 
in a controlling and “calculative” mode that hides 
aspects of the world. The central lesson of Dewey’s 
Experience and Nature complements Heidegger’s insight: 
Whatever is made visible by intelligence is always 
situated within the invisible. Yet unlike Heidegger (on a 
                                                 
8
 Sidney Hook, John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait (New 
York: John Day Co., 1939), 3. 
9
 Donald Worster, ed., Nature’s Economy: A History of 
Ecological Ideas (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 53ff. 
standard reading), Dewey nowhere relegates 
engagement with practical human problems to second-
class status. Dewey wrote, for instance:  
The visible is set in the invisible; and in the end 
what is unseen decides what happens in the 
seen; the tangible rests precariously upon the 
untouched and ungrasped. The contrast and the 
potential maladjustment of the immediate, the 
conspicuous and focal phase of things, with those 
indirect and hidden factors which determine the 
origin and career of what is present, are 
indestructible features of any and every 
experience. (LW 1:44) 
 
With his rich ecological imagination, Dewey 
perceived that we typically fail to see the visible in light 
of the invisible, to intellectually map what we are 
focusing on so as to include the constitutive, enveloping 
situation or complex system. But in contrast with 
Heidegger, Dewey bitingly criticized all holdovers of the 
disengaged medieval vita contemplativa as aristocratic 
philosophies that maintain “institutionalized class 
interest” (LW 15:191).
10
 
Albert Borgmann has developed Heidegger’s insights 
to explore the way our lives become dominated by 
efficient devices.
11
 For example, most of us in 
industrialized societies pay bills to run a furnace, 
replacing the seasonal rhythms that once centered on 
the hearth. Some devices have improved our quality of 
life, but we have also lost meaning-making “focal 
practices” that brought coherence, significance, and a 
sense of place. In his reconstruction of an early 
nineteenth-century boy’s diary, Diary of an Early 
American Boy, Eric Sloane writes: “Few of us today 
                                                 
10
 For example, see Rorty’s comparison of Heidegger and 
Dewey on the latter’s treatment of “philosophies as if they 
were means to the enhancement of human life” (Richard 
Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism [Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1982], 50).  
11
 On Borgmannn’s critique, see Paul B. Thompson, The 
Agrarian Vision (Lexington, KY: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2010), ch. 5, “Farming as Focal Practice.” For a 
critique of Borgmannn and Heidegger from the 
standpoint of Dewey’s philosophy of technology, see 
Larry A. Hickman, Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism: 
Lessons from John Dewey (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2007), 92–111. 
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would think of wood splitting as anything but a tedious 
chore, but when one learns to do it well, there is a 
certain joy involved. Striking your axe in an exact spot, 
watching a log divide miraculously into segments and 
squares with single blows, or even learning to stack a 
simple pile of wood correctly, gives pleasure to the art of 
woodsmanship.”
12
 
We should strive to conserve practices, ideas, and 
things that are functioning well. If in a specific context 
the aesthetic richness we directly experience as fulfilling 
in the course of daily occupations and interactions—for 
example, splitting wood and building fires—is reduced by 
a proposed technological device, then in that context the 
device may be a dysfunctional means to our most 
valuable ends. (Of course this depends on the situation 
and on our overall set of ends.) Our global fixation on 
new and ever-more-efficient devices has on the whole 
been blind, ill-considered, and exclusive. Quality of life 
has too often been eroded and contracted rather than 
enhanced and secured. Insofar as we establish 
democratic processes to formulate and manage 
problems by examining means in light of ends while 
reexamining ends in light of proposed means, we 
proceed intelligently. The direction of technological 
development is not an inevitable forward march. Insofar 
as cooperative intelligence can guide it, in Dewey’s view 
it does not honor contemplative life if we abdicate or 
downgrade that responsibility.  
Dewey argues in the newly recovered and published 
“lost” book, Unmodern Philosophy and Modern 
Philosophy (2012), that most of the techno-industrial and 
vocational activities which we pretend are 
“instrumental” actually reduce “to a very minimum the 
esthetic aspect of experiences had in the course of the 
daily occupation.” We enjoy the anticipation of getting 
paid, but the way we make our living is “isolated from 
direct consummation and fulfillment.”
13
 To respond that 
                                                 
12
 Eric Sloane, Diary of an Early American Boy (Mineola, 
NY: Courier Dover Publications, 2008), 31. 
13
 John Dewey, Unmodern Philosophy and Modern 
this is “just the nature of work” is a sign of neither 
practical realism nor wisdom. In Experience and Nature, 
Dewey clarified the tragic cost of an industrial 
imagination that idolizes efficient production and 
affordable consumption without taking stock of their 
collateral consequences: 
The existence of activities that have no 
immediate enjoyed intrinsic meaning is 
undeniable. They include much of our labors in 
home, factory, laboratory, and study. By no 
stretch of language can they be termed either 
artistic or esthetic. … So we optimistically call 
them “useful” and let it go at that. … If we were 
to ask useful for what? we should be obliged to 
examine their actual consequences, and when 
we once honestly and fully faced these 
consequences we should probably find ground 
for calling such activities detrimental rather than 
useful. (LW 1:271–72) 
 
Our problem, then, is not instrumental intelligence, 
but mechanically instrumental activity. Larry Hickman 
helpfully engages Dewey to criticize the latter as a 
narrowing product of “straight-line” instrumentalism 
that “works toward fixed goals, heedless of the collateral 
problems and opportunities that arise during the thick of 
deliberation.”
14
  
 
 
                                                                       
Philosophy, ed. Phillip Deen (Carbondale, IL: SIU Press, 
2012), 344. Dewey’s robust philosophy of technology is 
beginning to receive a new round of scholarly attention 
in light of insights in this book (see especially 203–51).  
14
 Hickman, “Nature as Culture: John Dewey’s Pragmatic 
Naturalism,” 50. Other relevant works by Hickman 
include Philosophical Tools for Technological Culture: 
Putting Pragmatism to Work (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 2001); “Dewey’s Theory of Inquiry,” in 
Reading Dewey: Interpretations for a Postmodern 
Generation, ed. Larry A. Hickman (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1998); and his earlier defense of 
a pragmatic view of technology in John Dewey’s 
Pragmatic Technology (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1990), 13ff. In contrast with Hickman’s 
reading, Robert Brandom presents Dewey as a 
materialist whose instrumentalism pivots on subjective 
satisfaction of desires. See Robert B. 
Brandom, Perspectives on Pragmatism (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2011), 42, 51–51, 72–77. 
Brandom’s reading differs markedly from my own. 
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Dewey argued that blanket criticism of means–end 
or technological reasoning—such as the now-popular 
notion in some circles that such reasoning is invariably 
exploitative—does little “to free experience from routine 
and from caprice” (MW 10:45). He sought to liberate 
human activities from an anesthetizing status quo, in 
part by advancing an educational vision of forward-
looking, aesthetically funded intelligence that 
imaginatively projects new ends. Ends fixed in advance 
and quarantined from scrutiny, such the worship of 
efficiency, can impoverish the art of inquiry.
15
 Through 
imaginative engagement we see extant conditions in 
light of novel possibilities so that we might guide the 
world’s transformation by taking an “excursion from the 
actual into the possible” (LW 8:198). This is part of 
Dewey’s picture of technological innovation and 
instrumental intelligence that have intrinsic worth, that 
is, in which means are valued for themselves and 
aesthetically enjoyed (MW 10:45). It is a perverse irony 
that what goes by the name of progress is often 
purchased by sacrificing the very goods this “progress” is 
defensibly a means toward.
16
 
 
Dewey’s Instrumentalism vs. Intellectualism:  
Progress Serves the Aesthetic 
 
Perhaps the most common interpretive error among 
both critics and admirers of Dewey has been to read him 
mostly as a champion of science. This misreading 
marginalizes Dewey’s reflections on the primacy of the 
qualitative in works such as Experience and Nature, 
“Qualitative Thought,” and Art as Experience. Dewey 
repeatedly criticized the “intellectualist’s fallacy” that 
reduces all experiencing to knowing. The “real” or 
“nature” cannot be boiled down to the distinct objects of 
scientific study alone; nature’s emergent potential is also 
                                                 
15
 On inquiry as art, see Jim Garrison, Dewey and Eros: 
Wisdom and Desire in the Art of 
Thinking (New York: Teachers College Press, 1997). 
16
 I am grateful to Routledge Press for permission to 
draw from the manuscript of my book Dewey (New York: 
Routledge, 2015) in the Routledge Philosophers series. 
disclosed by artistic-aesthetic and practical experiences. 
The Western philosophical tradition has singled out 
knowing as quintessentially human, as though it is less 
essentially human to experience things practically or 
aesthetically. We have correlatively reduced nature to 
the distinct and explicit traits by which things are known.  
This “vicious” intellectualism, as James called it, is a 
bad intellectual habit that we need to get over. Not only 
does it tend to reduce nature to inert mechanisms “out 
there,” a tired relic of pre-ecological European 
philosophies, but it also obscures or excludes the 
primary characteristics through which things are used, 
enjoyed, loved, and shunned. Moreover, when we fail 
empirically to note that nature is charged with hidden 
potential, then human imagination and creativity are left 
to seek refuge in a private and occult subjective realm 
discontinuous with natural events and forces. That which 
is implicit and noncognitive is relegated to the private 
and non-natural inner space of “mind” set over and 
against the “real” traits of nature, as though mind and 
culture are not themselves natural outcroppings. 
In opposition, Dewey asserted that “what is really ‘in’ 
experience extends much further than that which at any 
time is known” (LW 1:27). Things are dealt with, used, 
enjoyed, and endured (LW 1:28). A genuinely empirical 
philosophy should not ignore the primary originating 
context that gives urgent import and intent to what is 
judged and scientifically known. This qualitatively rich 
primary context—which Dewey in Experience and Nature 
called “primary experience”—makes scientific 
knowledge and technology themselves biologically 
explicable as ways of enriching what Dewey called 
human “action-undergoing” (LW 1:28–30). 
When we ask which scientific questions are most 
worthy of investigation, and which technologies are 
actually worth developing, we broach questions that 
implicate our highest ideals. What should count as 
progress? Ultimately, what is our science, technology, 
and information most defensibly a means toward? In 
response, Dewey emphasized the immediately possessed 
meanings and enjoyments that characterize all 
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experiences developed toward fulfillment (LW 10:42-50). 
He consistently condemned the still-dominant utilitarian-
industrial outlook that narrows the affective horizon of 
immediate experience, to the detriment of meaningful, 
value-rich, and responsive lives. Science, which Dewey 
construed broadly to encompass all of the 
predominantly intellectual endeavors engaged in an 
experimental method of inquiry—regardless of the 
mother tongues of those doing the knowing—is a central 
art that is “auxiliary to the generation and utilization of 
other arts” (LW 10:33). In a footnote to Art as 
Experience, Dewey cross-referenced an earlier remark 
from Experience and Nature, doing the scholarship for us 
to ensure we do not mistake or subvert his meaning. In 
Experience and Nature he had written:  
The only distinction worth drawing is not 
between practice and theory, but between those 
modes of practice that are not intelligent, not 
inherently and immediately enjoyable, and those 
which are full of enjoyed meanings. When this 
perception dawns, it will be a commonplace that 
art—the mode of activity that is charged with 
meanings capable of immediately enjoyed 
possession—is the complete culmination of 
nature, and that “science” is properly a 
handmaiden that conducts natural events to this 
happy issue. (LW 1:269) 
 
Hence, for Dewey, science (when taken broadly) is an 
operative art whose proper role is to serve the aesthetic 
(when taken broadly) (LW 10:33; LW 1:269). This 
statement hinges on Dewey’s sense of the objective and 
revelatory aspects of the aesthetic. Both as a natural 
phase of ordinary life and as developed in formalized 
arts, the aesthetic quality of an experience “is attained 
only when, by some means, terms are made with the 
environment” (LW 10:23). As Jeffrey Petts succinctly 
captures Dewey’s unconventional sense, “aesthetic 
experience is a critical, adaptive felt response, revealing 
value in the world.”
17
  
 
                                                 
17
 Jeffrey Petts, “Aesthetic Experience and the Revelation 
of Value,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 58, no. 
1 (2000): 61–71. 
Critics of Dewey’s “instrumentalist” theory of inquiry 
nonetheless often mistake it as (a) an attack on any 
conception of intrinsic value, or (b) an attempt to 
collapse the value of means into the value of ends. The 
latter misreading has long baffled careful readers of 
Dewey’s ethical and political works, which pivot on the 
idea that we must state our objectives—for example, 
political ends such as justice, equality, and liberty—in 
terms of the social means we plan to use to attain them. 
Then we must dramatically rehearse the whole set of 
resulting consequences (see Theory of Valuation, LW 
13:226-236). In contrast with 1930s Marxists, Dewey’s 
pragmatist political theory, as expressed in works such as 
Liberalism and Social Action (1935), was accordingly a 
radicalism for grown-ups—those with the courage and 
patience to secure the “democratic means to achieve our 
democratic ends” (LW 11:332), as he wrote in his 1937 
critique of Soviet exile Leo Trotsky.  
 The former popular misreading, namely that 
Dewey’s instrumentalism was somehow an attack on 
intrinsic value, has led imperceptive critics to write as 
though Deweyans might at any moment grab Yo-Yo Ma 
by the collar and demand to know “What are you doing 
that for?” There is indeed a purpose to playing the cello. 
It is to enhance this immediate (often shared) 
experience. The cello is “instrumental” to just that, the 
playing and listening, whatever other value it may have 
by way of showcasing talent or garnering a livelihood. 
Contrary to attributions by influential critics like Brand 
Blanshard, Dewey did not reject the idea of immediate 
enjoyments such as growth, joyfulness, learning, love, or 
listening to a cello being valued without conscious 
reference to further purposes. He rejected the notion of 
intrinsic value only (1) in the Kantian sense in which the 
end is valued unconditionally and hence is beyond 
appraisal, good without qualification, or (2) in the sense 
in which there are goods that in no way enrich future 
experience, which is hard to imagine.  
In Art as Experience, Dewey clarified his 
instrumentalism in light of this lifelong emphasis on the 
felt significance of immediate experience:  
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What is intimated to my mind, is, that in both 
production and enjoyed perception of works of 
art, knowledge is transformed; it becomes 
something more than knowledge because it is 
merged with non-intellectual elements to form 
an experience worthwhile as an experience. I 
have from time to time set forth a conception of 
knowledge as being “instrumental.” Strange 
meanings have been imputed by critics to this 
conception. Its actual content is simple: 
Knowledge is instrumental to the enrichment of 
immediate experience through the control over 
action that it exercises. (LW 10:294) 
 
Instruments invariably imply purposes, and hence 
some conception of progress toward those purposes. 
Perhaps Dewey’s clearest discussion of progress was in 
the concluding section of Human Nature and Conduct. 
The gist of his view is that we habitually look for progress 
in the wrong place because we carry around with us 
some big idea of a final and ultimate good (see MW 
14:198). This struck Dewey as analogous to a physician 
who seeks to heal patients in light of some static, 
complete, and universal ideal of perfect health, instead 
of experimentally aiding living processes of recovering 
(MW 14:196).  
Witness, for example, the quest today by well-
meaning economists for a single, predetermined metric 
that we should always follow to optimize policy 
outcomes. The unexamined assumption is that policy 
experts just set the facts in front of their minds’ eyes, 
apply the right principles, rules, or metrics, and reach an 
optimized outcome that is ready-to-implement. This 
would be fine if, from the start, there had been only one 
legitimate direction in which to be tugged; or if the 
problem eliciting investigation had been merely 
psychological, or simply intellectual, not inextricably 
folded into the existential situation at hand. However, 
situational conflicts are not merely specious, and there is 
seldom a single correct rational judgment that will sweep 
the path to progress clear. Situational conflicts are rarely 
so superficial as to evaporate upon analysis.  
Most widely shared problems today are “wicked” 
rather than benign, in the contemporary sense that (1) 
there is no single definitive solution and (2) the way we 
formulate a problem and appraise success in dealing 
with it are themselves at issue. Dewey’s experimental 
approach, as Bryan Norton wisely emphasizes in 
Sustainable Values, Sustainable Change (2015), was 
always more improvisational, pluralistic, adaptive, social, 
and nimble-footed.
18
 Dewey sought a practical footing 
informed by conflicting, legitimate claims in complicated 
situations. These forces, which inhere in the situation 
and not just in our vexed psyches, tug us in incompatible 
directions. We must deal with them if we are to learn 
our ways together—locally, regionally, nationally, and 
globally—toward our best ideals. Indeed, Dewey implied 
that the need to manage such divergent forces is what 
gives practical decision making its richness and vitality 
(see “Three Independent Factors in Morals,” LW 5:280-
281). 
Achievements and progressive innovations in our 
dealings with intrinsically messy problems are real, and 
they are to be celebrated. But they are not measurable 
by any rigid “general formula of progress” (MW 14:196). 
Dewey rejected the two most influential variations of the 
misguided quest for an absolute standard by which to 
measure progress: 1) the juvenile notion that progress 
toward our ideals “means a definite sum of 
accomplishment which will forever stay done, and which 
by an exact amount lessens the amount still to be done… 
on our road to a final stable and unperplexed goal,” and 
(2) the popular though foolishly pessimistic notion that 
all achievements are negligible in comparison to ultimate 
and perfect goods (MW 14:197-198).  
Even a Deweyan aesthetic imperative to act so as “to 
increase the meaning of present experience” (MW 
14:196) may, he argued, become a rigid standard that 
distracts people’s moral imaginations from “the concrete 
elements entering into the situations in which they have 
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 Bryan Norton, Sustainable Values, Sustainable Change 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). On “wicked 
problems,” see especially Norton, ch. 2. On Dewey and 
improvisational intelligence, cf. Steven Fesmire, John 
Dewey and Moral Imagination: Pragmatism in Ethics 
(Indiana University Press, 2003). 
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to act” (LW 5:288). Yet the ameliorative expansion of 
situations is the only place progress can really be found. 
Our best twenty-first century ideals—such as living 
healthier, more just, and more sustainable lives—make a 
positive difference only when we are inspired and 
stimulated to “study the needs and alternative 
possibilities” within a particular situation (MW 14:196). 
Meanwhile, every achievement complicates things and 
launches us upon a new experiment in living, a new 
“experimental adventure.” Hence, Dewey concludes: 
“From the side of what has gone before achievement 
settles something. From the side of what comes after, it 
complicates, introducing new problems, unsettling 
factors” (MW 14:197). 
In sum, Dewey conceived science and technology in 
the service of the revelatory significance of achieving 
something, that is, in the service of aesthetic 
consummations. This was the heart of his call to 
humanize techno-industrial civilization. 
  
